astray Chapter 2 Of Natural Right 第二章 自然权利

Chapter 2 Of Natural Right 第二章 自然权利

1．In our Theologico-Political Treatise we have treated of natural and civil right, and in our Ethics have explained the nature of wrong-doing, merit, justice, injustice, and lastly, of human liberty. Yet, lest the readers of the present treatise should have to seek elsewhere those points, which especially concern it, I have determined to explain them here again, and give a deductive proof of them.

第一节 在《神学政治论》一书中我们论述了自然权利和城市权利。在《伦理学》一书中，我们论述了罪恶、美德、公正、不公正以及人类自由。但是，为免读者再去别的书中查找这些与本书特别相关的问题，在这里我将再次对这些观点进行阐述并加以演绎论证。

2．Any natural thing whatever can be just as well conceived, whether it exists or does not exist. As then the beginning of the existence of natural things cannot be inferred from their definition, so neither can their continuing to exist. For their ideal essence is the same, after they have begun to exist, as it was before they existed. As then their beginning to exist cannot be inferred from their essence, so neither can their continuing to exist; but they need the same power to enable them to go on existing, as to enable them to begin to exist. From which it follows, that the power, by which natural things exist, and therefore that by which they operate, can be no other than the eternal power of God itself. For were it another and a created power, it could not preserve itself, much less natural things, but it would itself, in order to continue to exist, have need of the same power which it needed to be created.

第二节 任何自然的东西，不管它是存在的或不存在的，都可以予以合理的设想。所以，人们无法从自然事物的定义中推断出其最初的存在，也无法由此推断出其将来的存在。由于它们的理想本质在它们存在前后都是一样的，因此，无法从它们的本质推断出它们开始的存在，也无法从其本质推断出它们将来的存在。但是它们都需要同样的一种力量来使得它们能存在并继续存在下去。这种自然物赖以存在并运行的力量，是只有上帝才有的永恒的力量。如果是其他的力量，它不可能维持下来，更别说维持自然事物的存在了。但是它为了继续存在，需要一种与它被创造时所需要过的力量相同的力量。

3．From this fact therefore, that is, that the power whereby natural things exist and operate is the very power of God itself, we easily understand what natural right is. For as God has a right to everything, and God's right is nothing else, but his very power, as far as the latter is considered to be absolutely free; it follows from this, that every natural thing has by nature as much right, as it has power to exist and operate; since the natural power of every natural thing, whereby it exists and operates, is nothing else but the power of God, which is absolutely free.

第三节 从这一事实，即自然事物赖以存在和运行的力量是上帝的力量，我们不难理解自然权利是什么。因为上帝拥有对一切事物的权利，而且它的权利就是那种被认为绝对自由的神力，所以，每一种自然事物天生拥有的权利就是它存在和运行的力量，这种力量就是上帝绝对自由的神力。

4．And so by natural right I understand the very laws or rules of nature, in accordance with which everything takes place, in other words, the power of nature itself. And so the natural right of universal nature, and consequently of every individual thing, extends as far as its power: and accordingly, whatever any man does after the laws of his nature, he does by the highest natural right, and he has as much right over nature as he has power.

第四节 因此，说到自然权利，我的理解是，它就是自然界的规律或法则，万事的发生都依据它，即自然本身的力量。宇宙自然及个体的自然权利和它的力量所能及的范围一样广大，所以，任何一个人依其本性做任何事情，所依据的都是最高的自然权利，也是依其本身的力量行使他对自然的权利。

5．If then human nature had been so constituted, that men should live according to the mere dictate of reason, and attempt nothing inconsistent therewith, in that case natural right, considered as special to mankind, would be determined by the power of reason only. But men are more led by blind desire, than by reason: and therefore the natural power or right of human beings should be limited, not by reason, but by every appetite, whereby they are determined to action, or seek their own preservation. I, for my part, admit, that those desires, which arise not from reason, are not so much actions as passive affections of man. But as we are treating here of the universal power or right of nature, we cannot here recognize any distinction between desires, which are engendered in us by reason, and those which are engendered by other causes; since the latter, as much as the former, are effects of nature, and display the natural impulse, by which man strives to continue in existence. For man, be he learned or ignorant, is part of nature, and everything, by which any man is determined to action, ought to be referred to the power of nature, that is, to that power, as it is limited by the nature of this or that man. For man, whether guided by reason or mere desire, does nothing save in accordance with the laws and rules of nature, that is, by natural right (Sec. 4).

第五节 假如人的本性是既定的astray，那么人类就应该是只依据理性的指令而生活，不去尝试违背理性的事情。若果真如此，那么被视为人类特殊权利的自然权利将由理性的力量来决定。但是，较之理性，人类更容易受盲目的欲望驱使。所以人类的自然权利或力量应该受到限制，不是受理性限制，而是受限于人们借以行动或保护自己的欲望。我承认，非理性的欲望并不是人类的主动行为，而是人的被动情感。但是，因为我们在此探讨的是自然的普遍权利或力量，所以不在这里辨别哪些欲望是理性的，哪些欲望是其他原因引起的。两种欲望都是自然的结果，体现自然的冲动，人类就是因此冲动而存续。人类，不管是博学的或是无知的，都是自然的一部分，人类行动的所有动机都与自然力量有关，也就是说，自然力量限制人的本性。不管人类是受理性指引或单纯的欲望驱使，人总是按照自然法则或自然规律行事，也就是按照自然权利行事（本章第四节）。

6．But most people believe, that the ignorant rather disturb than follow the course of nature, and conceive of mankind, in nature as of one dominion within another. For they maintain, that the human mind is produced by no natural causes, but created directly by God, and is so independent of other things, that it has an absolute power to determine itself, and make a right use of reason. Experience, however, teaches us but too well, that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind, than a sound body. Next, inasmuch as everything whatever, as far as in it lies, strives to preserve its own existence, we cannot at all doubt, that, were it as much in our power to live after the dictate of reason, as to be led by blind desire, all would be led by reason, and order their lives wisely; which is very far from being the case. For “Each is attracted by his own delight.“

第六节 但是大多数人认为，无知的人宁愿搅乱自然规律也不遵循自然规律。他们还认为人类在自然界中就是国中之国。他们坚持认为人的创造与自然规律无关，而是直接由上帝创造的，因而独立于其他一切事物，人类有绝对的力量来决定自己，做出正确的推断。然而经验充分证明，拥有健全的身体并不是我们力所能及的，就像我们没有能力保证自己能拥有健全的精神一样。此外，既然任何事物都会尽其所能保全自己的存在，无疑，我们也应该具有一样的能力去依据理性的指令而生活，如同我们在盲目的欲望驱使下生活那样。那么，所有人都将受理性指引，用理性安排生活。但是事实远非如此，因为，“每个人都无法抵挡那些令自己愉悦之事的诱惑。”

Nor do divines remove this difficulty, at least not by deciding, that the cause of this want of power is a vice or sin in human nature, deriving its origin from our first parents' fall. For if it was even in the first man's power as much to stand as to fall, and he was in possession of his senses, and had his nature unimpaired, how could it be, that he fell in spite of his knowledge and foresight? But they say, that he was deceived by the devil. Who then was it, that deceived the devil himself? Who, I say, so maddened the very being that excelled all other created intelligences, that he wished to be greater than God? For was not his effort too, supposing him of sound mind, to preserve himself and his existence, as far as in him lay? Besides, how could it happen, that the first man himself, being in his senses, and master of his own will, should be led astray, and suffer himself to be taken mentally captive? For if he had the power to make a right use of reason, it was not possible for him to be deceived, for as far as in him lay, he of necessity strove to preserve his existence and his soundness of mind. But the hypothesis is, that he had this in his power; therefore he of necessity maintained his soundness of mind, and could not be deceived. But this from his history, is known to be false. And, accordingly, it must be admitted, that it was not in the first man's power to make a right use of reason, but that, like us, he was subject to passions.

神学家也不能解决这个问题。虽然他们认为这种渴望力量的动机是人性中的缺点或罪过，而且它的起源自我们的第一代祖先亚当出现时就已经存在，但是，这种说法对解决这个问题也无济于事。如果亚当天生就既能抵制诱惑也会堕落犯错，同时又具有健全的头脑，天性未受侵蚀，那么他怎么可能会在明知结局的情况下甘心堕落呢？神学家说他是受到撒旦的欺骗，那么又是谁欺骗了撒旦？是谁会让那个比所有已被创造出来的智者更优秀的人失去理智，让他妄想要比上帝更伟大？如果撒旦头脑健全，那么他岂不是应想方设法保护自己并维持自己的存在？而且，如果始祖亚当头脑健全，能控制自己意愿，又怎会被引入歧途，让自己思想上收到欺骗诱惑？如果他有能力正确使用理性，他就不可能被欺骗，因为他必定会尽他所能去保全他的存在和思维的鉴别力。既然人们假定他具有这个能力，那么他一定会保全自己健全的头脑而不会被骗。但是从他的故事中我们知道他被骗了。所以我们必须承认，始祖亚当也没有能力做到正确运用理性，他和我们一样会受制于情感。

7．But that man, like other beings, as far as in him lies, strives to preserve his existence, no one can deny. For if any distinction could be conceived on this point, it must arise from man's having a free will. But the freer we conceived man to be, the more we should be forced to maintain, that he must of necessity preserve his existence and be in possession of his senses; as anyone will easily grant me, that does not confound liberty with contingency. For liberty is a virtue, or excellence. Whatever, therefore, convicts a man of weakness cannot be ascribed to his liberty. And so man can by no means be called free, because he is able not to exist or not to use his reason, but only in so far as he preserves the power of existing and operating according to the laws of human nature. The more, therefore, we consider man to be free, the less we can say, that he can neglect to use reason, or choose evil in preference to good; and, therefore, God, who exists in absolute liberty, also understands and operates of necessity, that is, exists, understands, and operates according to the necessity of his own nature. For there is no doubt, that God operates by the same liberty whereby he exists. As then he exists by the necessity of his own nature, by the necessity of his own nature also he acts, that is, he acts with absolute liberty.

第七节 但是无可否认，人和自然界的其他东西一样，会尽其所能保全自己的存在。如果说在这方面人与其他东西之间存在什么区别，那应该是，我们认为人类拥有自由意志。然而，我们认为一个人越自由，便也越不得不承认他必然要维持生存和拥有理性。只要不把自由和偶然混为一谈，我想任何人都会同意我的观点。因为自由是一种美德，是一种优越性。因此，任何让人懦弱无能的东西都不是自由。如果一个人不能生存，或者不能运用理性，则根本不能说他是自由的。只有在他有能力能根据人性的规律维持生存和行事时，才能说他是自由的。因此，我们越认为一个人自由，我们就越不能说他会忽略理性，或者把邪恶置于善良之上。拥有绝对自由的上帝也明白，并必定会根据他自身本性的必然性而存在、理解和行动。无疑，上帝凭借他赖以生存的自由进行活动，所以上帝根据它自己本性的必然性去生存和行动，也就是说，他按照绝对的自由行动。

8．So we conclude, that it is not in the power of any man always to use his reason, and be at the highest pitch of human liberty, and yet that everyone always, as far as in him lies, strives to preserve his own existence; and that (since each has as much right as he has power) whatever anyone, be he learned or ignorant, attempts and does, he attempts and does by supreme natural right. From which it follows that the law and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and for the most part live, forbids nothing but what no one wishes or is able to do, and is not opposed to strife, hatred, anger, treachery, or, in general, anything that appetite suggests. For the bounds of nature are not the laws of human reason, which do but pursue the true interest and preservation of mankind, but other infinite laws, which regard the eternal order of universal nature, whereof man is an atom; and according to the necessity of this order only are all individual beings determined in a fixed manner to exist and operate. Whenever, then, anything in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we have but a partial knowledge of things, and are in the main ignorant of the order and coherence of nature as a whole, and because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictate of our own reason; although, in fact, what our reason pronounces bad, is not bad as regards the order and laws of universal nature, but only as regards the laws of our own nature taken separately.

第八节 由此我们以为，并不是每个人都有理性思考的能力，并不是每个人都有能力处在自由的最高程度。每个人总是尽其所能维持自己的生存；而且，不管他做什么，不管他是博学的或无知的，都会依据最高的自然权利去努力并行动（因为每个人拥有的权利和力量一样大）。由此可知，人类赖以出生并生活的自然法则只能限制那些无人想做或无人能做的事，它无法反对冲突、憎恨、愤怒和背叛，或者任何因欲望而引起的东西。因为自然的约束并不是人类理性的准则，人类理性的准则只追求人类的真正利益，保护人类的生存；而无数的其他法则，注重并制约的是宇宙自然的永恒秩序，人类在宇宙自然中只是沧海一粟而已。根据这种秩序的必然性，所有的个体在生存和行动时，都要被限定在一个固定的方式之中。因此任何时候，如果自然中的任何事情在我们看来荒谬可笑，甚至是邪恶的，那是因为我们仅仅了解这些事情的一部分，对自然整体的秩序和相关性并不了解；因为我们是根据自己的理性的指令来安排一切事情的。事实上，我们的理性认为是坏的事，相对于宇宙自然的秩序和法则而言，并不是坏事，但若仅从我们的人性准则来说，那就是坏事。

9．Besides, it follows that everyone is so far rightfully dependent on another, as he is under that other's authority, and so far independent, as he is able to repel all violence, and avenge to his heart's content all damage done to him, and in general to live after his own mind.

第九节 由此可以推断，只要一个人处于他人的权威之下，他就是处于他人的权利之下；只要他能够去除所有暴力，自主报复所有加在他身上的伤害，并且通常能按照自己的意愿生活，那么，他就是处在自己的权利之下。

10．He has another under his authority, who holds him bound, or has taken from him arms and means of defence or escape, or inspired him with fear, or so attached him to himself by past favour, that the man obliged would rather please his benefactor than himself, and live after his mind than after his own. He that has another under authority in the first or second of these ways, holds but his body, not his mind. But in the third or fourth way he has made dependent on himself as well the mind as the body of the other; yet only as long as the fear or hope lasts, for upon the removal of the feeling the other is left independent.

第十节 如果一个人把他人置于自己的力量控制之下，可能会有以下几种情况：一是捆住他；二是解除他的武器，剥夺他防卫或逃跑的方法；三是引起他的恐惧；四是用过去的恩惠束缚他，让他讨好他的恩人胜过取悦自己，宁愿按照恩人的意思生活。前两者情况只能控制他人的躯体，不能控制其思想；第三和第四种情况可以控制他人的躯体和思想。只要他人仍对自己心怀恐惧或希望，上述情况就会存在。一旦这些感觉消失，这个人就能再度处于他本身的权利之下。

11．The judgment can be dependent on another, only as far as that other can deceive the mind; whence it follows that the mind is so far independent, as it uses reason aright. Nay, inasmuch as human power is to be reckoned less by physical vigour than by mental strength, it follows that those men are most independent whose reason is strongest, and who are most guided thereby. And so I am altogether for calling a man so far free, as he is led by reason; because so far he is determined to action by such causes, as can be adequately understood by his unassisted nature, although by these causes he is necessarily determined to action. For liberty, as we showed above (Sec. 7), does not take away the necessity of acting, but supposes it.

第十一节 只要一个人的思想受到蒙骗，他就无法独立作出判断。因此可见，只要能正确运用理性，思想就是独立的。不仅如此，在估算人的力量时，往往更多是按意志的坚定来衡量，较少按体格的健壮来衡量，所以那些推理最缜密的人和最受理性引导的人，是最充分掌握自己权利的人。因此，只要一个人受理性引导，我们就把这种人称为完全自由的人，因为，他行动的原因取决于他独立的本性，这些原因必定会促使他采取行动。其实，就像前面（本章第七节）所述，自由并没有剥夺行动的必然性，反而是行动的先决条件。

12．The pledging of faith to any man, where one has but verbally promised to do this or that, which one might rightfully leave undone, or vice versa, remains so long valid as the will of him that gave his word remains unchanged. For he that has authority to break faith has, in fact, bated nothing of his own right, but only made a present of words. If, then, he, being by natural right judge in his own case, comes to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly (for “to err is human”), that more harm than profit will come of his promise, by the judgment of his own mind he decides that the promise should be broken, and by natural right (Sec. 9) he will break the same.

第十二节 如果一个人向他人口头承诺要做某事，却又可能最终不做这事，只要他承诺时的意志没有改变，他的诺言依旧有效。对有能力违背诺言的人来说，他的权利并没有减少，只是许了诺言而已。实际上，在这件事情中，如果他——根据自然权利他自己是自己的裁判官——得出或正确或错误的结论（因为判断失误是人之常情），即他的承诺将会得不偿失，于是根据他自己的判断他决定违背诺言，那么，他是依据自然权利背弃诺言（本章第九节）。

13．If two come together and unite their strength, they have jointly more power, and consequently more right over nature than both of them separately, and the more there are that have so joined in alliance, the more right they all collectively will possess.

第十三节 如果两个人把他们的力量结合起来，那么他们就有更大的力量，比起各自独立分开时，当然拥有更多对自然的权利。这样联合起来的人越多，他们共同拥有的权利就越多。

14．In so far as men are tormented by anger, envy, or any passion implying hatred, they are drawn asunder and made contrary one to another, and therefore are so much the more to be feared, as they are more powerful, crafty, and cunning than the other animals. And because men are in the highest degree liable to these passions (Chap. 1, Sec. 5), therefore men are naturally enemies. For he is my greatest enemy, whom I must most fear and be on my guard against.

第十四节 只要人们受愤怒、嫉妒或者任何一种含有憎恨的情绪的折磨，他们便表现得涣散，互相对立。因为人比其他动物更有力量，更狡猾机灵，所以更加可怕。而且，因为人类最容易受这些情感（第一章第五节）左右，所以他们自然而然地就互为敌人。某一方最害怕的人和最要提防的人，就是他最大的敌人。

15．But inasmuch as (Sec. 9) in the state of nature each is so long independent, as he can guard against oppression by another, and it is in vain for one man alone to try and guard against all, it follows hence that so long as the natural right of man is determined by the power of every individual, and belongs to everyone, so long it is a nonentity, existing in opinion rather than fact, as there is no assurance of making it good. And it is certain that the greater cause of fear every individual has, the less power, and consequently the less right, he possesses. To this must be added, that without mutual help men can hardly support life and cultivate the mind. And so our conclusion is, that that natural right, which is special to the human race, can hardly be conceived, except where men have general rights, and combine to defend the possession of the lands they inhabit and cultivate, to protect themselves, to repel all violence, and to live according to the general judgment of all. For (Sec. 18) the more there are that combine together, the more right they collectively possess. And if this is why the schoolmen want to call man a sociable animal— I mean because men in the state of nature can hardly be independent—I have nothing to say against them.

第十五节 但是，因为（本章第九节）自然状态下的每一个人只有在能够防止别人压迫的时候，才是处于他自己的权利之下，而仅仅依靠独自一人的力量又不足以去防范所有人。因此，只要人的自然权利是由每个个体的力量决定并属于每一个人，这种权利就不存在；或者它只是存在于空想之中，无法确保它的实现。当然，每个个体感到恐惧的原因越多，他拥有的力量就越小，结果他的权利也就越少。还有一点，如果没有相互的帮助，人类几乎难以生存，发展才智。所以我们的结论是，除非人类拥有共同的法律，并联合起来保护他们居住和耕种的土地，保护自己，驱除暴力，并按照所有人的共同意志生活，否则难以设想人类固有的自然权利会是什么。因为，他们越联合在一起，共同拥有的权利就越多（本章第十八节）。如果这是经院哲学家把人类称为社会性动物的理由，我的意思是自然状态下的人类难以处于自己的权利之下，那么，我无话可以反驳。

16．Where men have general rights, and are all guided, as it were, by one mind, it is certain (Sec. 13), that every individual has the less right the more the rest collectively exceed him in power; that is, he has, in fact, no right over nature but that which the common law allows him. But whatever he is ordered by the general consent, he is bound to execute, or may rightfully be compelled thereto (Sec. 4).

第十六节 如果人们拥有共同的法律并且合心同向，宛如受同一思想指导astray，当然（本章第十三节）其他人联合在一起超过个人的力量越多，每个个体的权利就越少。也就是说，除了普通法赋予他的权利，个体对自然事物不拥有权利。但是，无论公共协议命令他去做什么，他一定要执行，否则他人具有的权利可能会强迫他去完成（本章第四节）。

17．This right, which is determined by the power of a multitude, is generally called Dominion. And, speaking generally, he holds dominion, to whom are entrusted by common consent affairs of state—such as the laying down, interpretation, and abrogation of laws, the fortification of cities, deciding on war and peace, etc. But if this charge belongs to a council, composed of the general multitude, then the dominion is called a democracy; if the council be composed of certain chosen persons, then it is an aristocracy; and if, lastly, the care of affairs of state and, consequently, the dominion rest with one man, then it has the name of monarchy.

第十七节 这种由民众的力量所决定的权利通常称为统治权。一般来说，共同协议委托一个人管理国家事务，比如制定、解释和废除法律，城市的防御工事，决定战争与和平等，那么这个人就拥有统治权。但是如果这种管理权属于由普通民众组成的委员会，则称之为民主政体；如果属于由某些选定的人组成的委员会，则称之为贵族政体；最后，如果国家事务的管理以及随之而来的统治权属于一个人，那么它就是君主政体。

18．From what we have proved in this chapter, it becomes clear to us that, in the state of nature, wrong-doing is impossible; or, if anyone does wrong, it is to himself, not to another. For no one by the law of nature is bound to please another, unless he chooses, nor to hold anything to be good or evil, but what he himself, according to his own temperament, pronounces to be so; and, to speak generally, nothing is forbidden by the law of nature, except what is beyond everyone's power (Secs. 5 and 8). But wrongdoing is action, which cannot lawfully be committed. But if men by the ordinance of nature were bound to be led by reason, then all of necessity would be so led. For the ordinances of nature are the ordinances of God (Secs. 2, 3), which God has instituted by the liberty, whereby he exists, and they follow, therefore, from the necessity of the divine nature (Sec. 7), and, consequently, are eternal, and cannot be broken. But men are chiefly guided by appetite, without reason; yet for all this they do not disturb the course of nature, but follow it of necessity. And, therefore, a man ignorant and weak of mind, is no more bound by natural law to order his life wisely, than a sick man is bound to be sound of body.

第十八节 由本章的论证可以清楚看到，在自然状态下，不可能有“罪过”的概念；或者说，如果有人犯罪，那也对他自己犯罪，不是对他人犯罪。因为按照自然法则，除非出于自愿，否则没有一个人必须得去讨好他人。除非他愿意凭借自己的性情区别善恶，否则他没必要作出判断。而且，一般来说，除了超出每个人的力量范围之外的事（本章第五节和第八节），自然法则不会禁止任何事情。但是，罪过是不被正当承认的行为。如果根据自然法则，人类行为必须受理性指导，那么所有的事物也应该如此，因为自然法则就是神的法则（本章第二节和第三节）。神用他借以存在的自由建立了法则，因此，自然法则来自神的本性的必然性（本章第七节），因此它是永恒的、不可违背的。但是，人们主要是受非理性的欲望的引导。尽管如此，他们并没有扰乱自然的规律，而是必定要遵循规律。因此，自然法则不会要求一个无知的、意志薄弱的人必定要理性地安排他的生活，就像不会要求一个生病的人具备健康的身体一样。

19．Therefore wrong-doing cannot be conceived of, but under dominion—that is, where, by the general right of the whole dominion, it is decided what is good and what evil, and where no one does anything rightfully, save what he does in accordance with the general decree or consent (Sec. 16). For that, as we said in the last section, is wrong-doing, which cannot lawfully be committed, or is by law forbidden. But obedience is the constant will to execute that, which by law is good, and by the general decree ought to be done.

第十九节 因此，罪过只有在国家里面才会存在，也就是说起步网校，在国家里，要依据全国的共同法来分辨什么是善什么是恶；在国家里，除了符合共同法令或公共协议的事，没有人有权做其他事情（本章第十六节）。如上一节所述，罪过是不被正当承认的、是法律禁止的事情。而服从则是一种恒常的意志力，用以实行法律认为是善的事情，而且是共同法认为应该做的事情。

20．Yet we are accustomed to calling that also wrong, which is done against the sentence of sound reason, and to giving the name of obedience to the constant will to moderate the appetite according to the dictate of reason: a manner of speech which I should quite approve, did human liberty consist in the licence of appetite, and slavery in the dominion of reason. But as human liberty is the greater, the more man can be guided by reason, and moderate his appetite, we cannot without great impropriety call a rational life obedience, and give the name of wrong-doing to that which is, in fact, a weakness of the mind, not a licence of the mind directed against itself, and for which a man may be called a slave, rather than free (Secs. 7 and 11).

第二十节 然而，我们习惯把违反健全理性的指导而做的事情称作“罪过”，习惯把按照理性的指令而节制欲望的恒常意志力称作“服从”。假如人类的自由就在于欲望的放纵，而人类的束缚就在于理性的支配，那么我也会赞成这种说法。但是，由于人类越是受理性指引并节制欲望，他们就越自由，所以我们不能不恰当地把理性的生活称为服从，并给薄弱的意志冠以罪过的名义。实际上，意志薄弱并不是放纵意志，否则这个人与其说是自由的，不如说是处于奴役状态（本章第七节和第十一节）。

21．However, as reason teaches one to practise piety, and be of a calm and gentle spirit, which cannot be done save under dominion; and, further, as it is impossible for a multitude to be guided, as it were, by one mind, as under dominion is required, unless it has laws ordained according to the dictate of reason; men who are accustomed to living under dominion are not, therefore, using words so improperly, when they call that wrong-doing which is done against the sentence of reason, because the laws of the best dominion ought to be framed according to that dictate (Sec. 18). But, as for my saying (Sec. 18) that man in a state of nature, if he does wrong at all, does it against himself, see, on this point, Chap. 4. Secs. 4, 5, where is shown, in what sense we can say, that he who holds dominion and possesses natural right, is bound by laws and can do wrong.

第二十一节 然而，理性教导人们奉行道义，保持平静温和的心境，而这只有在国家里才能做到。而且，民众不可能像国家要求的那样万众一心如同受同一思想引导，除非国家拥有按照理性的指令建立起来的法律。因此，当习惯生活在国家里的人把违背理性的行为称为罪过时，他们并没有用词不当；因为要治理好国家，其法律应该要根据理性的指令来制定（本章第十八节）。但是如我之前所述（本章第十八节），自然状态下的人，如果他犯罪，也是对自己犯罪，第四章的第四节和第五节将解释这一点，也会说明从什么意义上我们可以说，拥有统治权和自然权利的人要受法律的约束以及可能犯罪。

22．As far as religion is concerned, it is further clear, that a man is most free and most obedient to himself when he most loves God, and worships him in sincerity. But so far as we regard, not the course of nature, which we do not understand, but the dictates of reason only, which respect religion, and likewise reflect that these dictates are revealed to us by God, speaking, as it were, within ourselves, or else were revealed to prophets as laws; so far, speaking in human fashion, we say that man obeys God when he worships him in sincerity, and, on the contrary, does wrong when he is led by blind desire. But, at the same time, we should remember that we are subject to God's authority, as clay to that of the potter, who of the same lump makes some vessels unto honour, and others unto dishonour. And thus man can, indeed, act contrarily to the decrees of God, as far as they have been written like laws in the minds of ourselves or the prophets, but against that eternal decree of God, which is written in universal nature, and has regard to the course of nature as a whole, he can do nothing.

第二十二节 就宗教方面来说，则更加明白易懂。当一个人至爱上帝并诚心崇拜上帝时，他最自由，最能从心所欲。但是目前我们不讨论我们所不了解的自然秩序，而只考虑涉及宗教的理性的指令，同时把这些指令当作是上帝给我们的启示，或者是以法则的形式给先知们的启示；这样，以人类的方式来说，当一个人诚心崇拜上帝时，他就是遵从上帝；相反地，当他被盲目的欲望引导时，他就是犯罪。但同时我们要记住，我们受制于上帝的权力，就像黏土之于陶匠。陶匠能把同样的一团泥做成贵重的器皿，也能做成低廉的器皿。因此，人类行事时可能会违反那已经铭记在我们或先知们心中的上帝的法令，但是如果违背那铭记于宇宙自然中关于整个自然规律的永恒的上帝的法令，则他将做不成任何事情。

23．As, then, wrong-doing and obedience, in their strict sense, so also justice and injustice cannot be conceived of, except under dominion. For nature offers nothing that can be called this man's rather than another's; but under nature everything belongs to all—that is, they have authority to claim it for themselves. But under dominion, where it is by common law determined what belongs to this man, and what to that, he is called just who has a constant will to render to every man his own, but he unjust who strives, on the contrary, to make his own that which belongs to another.

第二十三节 因此，从严格意义上说，犯罪与服从，公正与不公正，只有在国家里才能设想。因为没有一种自然界的东西是属于这个人而不属于那个人的，自然中所有的东西属于所有的人，也就是说，每个人都有权声称自然的东西是他的。但是，在国家里，有共同的法律规定什么东西属于这个人，什么东西属于那个人。如果一个人具有恒常意志力，让每个人拥有他自己本该拥有的东西，则他被认为是公正的；但是，如果他企图把属于别人的东西占为己有，那他就是不公正的。

24．But that praise and blame are emotions of joy and sadness, accompanied by an idea of human excellence or weakness as their cause, we have explained in our Ethics.

第二十四节 但是，这种赞扬或指责只是一种快乐或难过的情感，与之相伴的是这种观点：人类的美德或缺点是产生这种情感的原因。我们在《伦理学》一书中论述过这一点。

.Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. xvi.

.Ethics, iv. 37, note 2.

.Ibid., ii. 48, 49, note.

.Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65.

.Romans ix. 21.

.见《神学政治论》第16章。

.《伦理学》第四部分，命题三十七，附释二。

.同上，第二部分，命题四十八、四十九，附释。

.维吉尔，《牧歌》ii，65。

.《新约·罗马人书》第9章第21节。